Early Writings — Page 61
HADRAT MIRZA GHULAM AHMAD AS 61 It is true, nonetheless, that since contingent beings are similar in respect of their basic elemental constitution-certain character- istics they possess are beside their fundamental essence and so they do share certain traits with each other. For example, a human being, a horse, and even a tree share a similarity in substance, three-dimensional form and in their faculty of growth. Further, in terms of their ability to feel and move by independent choice man and horse are alike. However, in their fundamental essence the two are surely different from one other. In short, the accidental properties of contingent beings is in addition to their fundamen- tal essence and at times a similarity or difference can exist in var- ious cases between such beings. Moreover, despite their differing fundamental essences and natures, at times, on account of shared properties, they may be classified as falling under the same genus. As a matter of fact, sometimes on account of even one essential property, entities can become one genus. Do you know why this is the case? This is because their material constitution is in addition to their fundamental essence, and the essence of their material constitution is the same. Now, it is perhaps clear to you that this sharing of traits between contingents, does not imply equality in their essential properties; rather, this is an external similarity in accidental properties. Other animals can never be partners to man in terms of his inner eye which may be described as insight of the heart (enlightenment). Towards the end of his essay, Bawa Sahib chose to remain silent after having stated that all the arguments presented by me were mere fallacies and thus unworthy of refutation. From this state- ment, every wise and intelligent person has perhaps immediately understood why Bawa Sahib felt compelled to utter such words.