Early Writings — Page 60
60 THE human beings, yet in doing so they cannot be deemed equal to or comparable to human beings. The example you have cited here is not a befitting one. Had you pondered even slightly in this regard, you would not have presented such an example at all. My honourable sir! Who says that contingent beings can- not possess similarity and resemblance so far as external charac- teristics are concerned? The matter of contention here, in fact, is whether anything other than God can share with Him in His divine attributes, or whether His attributes are exclusive to Him alone? As regards this disputed issue, you are the one who makes a claim; however, the example you have cited pertains to contingent beings, whereas this has no relevance to the debate at hand. You are obliged to put forth an example which relates to the issue at hand. Only then will your argument stand proven. Otherwise, to speak of partnership and resemblance in terms of contingent beings cannot serve as a clinching argument against me. Moreover, it is not appropriate to judge the inherent qualities of God against characteristics possessed by contingent beings. In addition to this it should also be noted that even in the case of contingent beings, their inherent attributes are related distinctly to their essences. For instance, the complete definition of man is that he is a rational animal and this quality of being 'rational' is from among his essential characteristics; it is the differentia that distinguishes him from other species. The differentia of man is not his faculty of sight or his ability to see with his eyes. For even if he were to become blind, he would still remain a human being. In reality, the essential characteristic of man may be defined as that which subsists even after his soul has left the corporeal body.