The Gulf Crisis and New World Order

by Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad

Page 355 of 415

The Gulf Crisis and New World Order — Page 355

The Gulf Crisis & The New World Order "The actions and decisions taken by the United States after aug 2, while having the appearance of diplomacy for peace, were in fact the result of deliberate choices toward a very different end. It was three choices - the president's assertions notwithstanding- that moved us inexorably along the path of war. We demonized and dehumanized our adversary. We indulged in personal name calling, false analogies in past wars and demonic leaders of earlier times, then deliberately provoked Hussein through threats and insults, while lessening his incentive to respond to the pleas that were directed lo him by so many individuals and nations. We denied our own contribution to the problem. By placing the blame entirely on the shoulders of our adversary, failing to acknowledge our own contribution - bolstering Iraq's war machine and giving permissive signals before the conflict began, for example - we put him on the defensive and further limited his ability to respond constructively. We relied exclusively on the threatened use of force. . . . . . . . . In an interview with ABC's Peter Jennings in November, Hussein asked that a dialogue be conducted between himself and President Bush "in which eyes could meet. " What he got was not dialogue but preconditions for capitulation. Having taken the position that only military power could "solve" the gulf crisis, we then shrouded our belligerent intent in the guise of collective will. Using the newly invigorated United Nations as a cover, we represented our determination to use force as being the result of a genuinely joint decision by the international community, rather than what it largely was: an American-engineered unilateral initiative. We disregarded the other side's stated grievances and claims, while demanding unconditional surrender. Our original position was doomed to failure if what we sought was peace. . . . . . . . . . We took no account of cultural differences. . . . . . . . . . 355