The Gulf Crisis and New World Order — Page 356
Sampling of public opinion on the Gu{f War We offered a response that was dispropriate to the problem. We assembled an overwhelming destructive force in the gulf without adequately anticipating the circumstances of using it as threatened. We exaggerated the original problem by arguing that international boundaries are inviolate - "sanctified" declared Rep. Stephen Solarz, D- N. Y. , one of the principal proponents of the war policy. . . . . In fact Kuwait's boundaries were arbitrarily drawn in 1961 by the withdrawing of British colonialists. We overcommitted ourselves to a course of action. By developing a U. N. deadline, to which we adhered with rigid insistence we lost room to manoeuvre and to explore peaceful methods of resolving the conflict. . . . . . . We used public presentation of conditions in order to intimidate the other side. Our public assertions - "no negotiations, no face saving, no linkage" - had the effect of hardening Hussein's response. . . . . . We paid lip service to efforts at diplomatic solutions. We indulged in a hypocritical pretence by announcing our "willingness to go the extra mile for peace" then refusing Hussein's demand that a meeting take place closer to Jan 15 than we liked. We were willing to talk only on our tenns, which we knew Hussein would have to reject. We derogated the other sides's conciliatory gesture. . . . . . . . For example, Hussein's initiative in releasing the hostages was viewed not as a show of good faith, or a desire to move toward settlement, but as a cunning attempt to manipulate world opinion. We insisted that the conflict be regarded as zero-swn. . . . . . . Consistently overlooked or dismissed were all alternative approaches that could tum a win-lose exchange into one with opportunities for both sides to do well. For example, we might have expressed a willingness to address the Palestinian-Israeli conflict while officially disclaiming linkage to the gulf crisis. 356