Early Writings — Page 18
18 THE requires Him to be possessed of perfect omnipotence, therefore, He must also possess the attribute of perfect providence. The minor premise of this argument states that a creator for whom it is necessary to possess perfect omnipotence must also possess the characteristic of divine providence. This premise is validated by the fact that reason necessarily requires that a crea- tor about whom we have accepted that he faces no difficulty in creating a thing and that when he decides to create a thing, he has available to him all the necessary means to do so, should also have those means available to him at all times and in any number that he requires. Now, this kind of perfect authority cannot be fully establishes unless the creator of an object is also able to create all the required parts of an object. The reason for this is because the availability of those required parts at all times and in any number that is required in the case of a creator who does not have abso- lute power to secure those parts-would be a potentiality which may not occur. As such, no philosophical argument can be built on a proposition that may not occur in certain circumstances. And if this manner of argumentation can be constructed, then someone ought to show us an example. The reason for this is obvious. To say that X does not possess perfect command over the creation of an object is synonymous with saying that it is possible that there may be a time when he is simply unable to create that object at all. Hence, this proves that a perfect maker cannot create anything unless he also has absolute power over everything. This is why no worldly artisan can claim that they are perfect makers. Instead, it is always witnessed in the case of all such craftsmen that when a person makes repeated visits to their workshops and presses them