The British Government and Jihad — Page 21
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND JIHAD 21 ence over Afghan tribes probably exceeds that of all previous Amirs, should gather the great scholars of religion and convene a discussion on the true nature of jihad. These religious scholars can then educate the public about its errors. In fact, the reli- gious scholars of this country should compile a few pamphlets in Pashto and make them available to the general public. I believe that this type of activity will have a tremendous influ- ence on people. The passions instilled by the ignorant maulavīs will gradually subside. The Amir's citizens will surely suffer if he fails to pay heed to this essential reform. The government that ignores such fatāwā from these mullāhs ultimately creates prob- lems for itself because these days the maulavis readily label people as disbelievers over minor religious differences, applying to them all other fatāwā that they apply to disbelievers. In light of this, even the Amir himself cannot remain safe from these fatāwā. It is quite possible that the maulavīs may cast the Amir out of the pale of Islam by taking offence over some trivial issue, and then subject him to the same fatāwā of jihad that they have applied to others. A group that has the power to declare a person to be a believer or disbeliever is dangerous, and the Amir should not be complacent with respect to them. They 12. The author is referring to a common belief amongst Muslims that steadfast participants in religious wars attain Paradise, re- gardless of whether they are killed in action or survive. In the former case, they are shahid (martyr) and in the latter, they are referred to as ghāzi. [Translator] 13. The Amir of the Afghan at that time was 'Abdur Rahman (1881-1901). He ascended to the throne after the second Af- ghan war (1878-80) and was recognised as the Amir of Kabul on the condition that he would not have political relations with any foreign power other than the British. [Translator]