Our God — Page 100
100 the earliest days when different peoples were unaware of one another and lacked social interaction, because every people’s experience and conditions differ from one another. So this sense should definitely have developed differently in various peoples. We observe that national customs and ways, which are certainly shaped by environmental circumstances, differ in various peo- ples. Thus, if the realisation of good and evil were based on the conditions and experience of people, it would have varied from people to people and from time to time. However, this is not the case; rather, this sense has always been seen in every age and among every people to be the same, meaning in the condition of uniformity. Take, for instance, two peoples with completely dif- ferent circumstances, one cultured, educated, and civilised and the other primitive, ignorant, and uncivilised. Despite this degree of difference, as far as the mere realisation [of good and evil] is concerned, it will be one and the same, and the differences, if any, will be in matters relating to its subsequent development; i. e. it would appear to have developed in one particular form and direction in one people and in a different form and direction in the other. However, when they are viewed independently of later effects, in essence they would appear the same in their form and style. This proves that the realisation [of good and evil] in its essence is not brought about by circumstances and experience but is inherent and no man is deprived of it. The second proof that the realisation of right and wrong is inherent rather than acquired is that it appears to be operating in certain matters wherein it cannot be attributed, by any wise person, to experience and surroundings. In other words, these matters are such that their benefit or loss cannot be ascertained