The Holy War

by Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad

Page 43 of 329

The Holy War — Page 43

Proceedings—Debate 24 May 1893 43 that thing that possesses the attributes of knowledge and will. The body is that thing which possesses neither knowledge nor will. The life-force is that regulating system which provides nourishment through the veins and sinews even to the plants. However, God, or the manifestation of Allah, is distinct from all such contingencies and exists independently in His own right by Himself. Third— In the thinking of the Honourable Mirza [Ghulam Ahmad] sahib, the soul of Jesus Christ came from Mary according to the law of nature, and, therefore, he cannot be God. In reply to this, I submit that although the human soul of Jesus was not born according to the law of nature, nonetheless, it is the same in its nature. And a soul does not derive from another soul, so that it may be said that his soul came by splitting from that of Mary. Since the soul is the very essence of a person and not the name of any law or ordinance, but a thing—the sum total of every attribute and defini- tion of a person—then why do you say that the soul of Jesus Christ, came from Mary? Why not say concerning it that a new creation came into being? Apart from this, what does this have to do with Divinity? We have repeatedly said that his being a manifestation of Allah is quite apart from his humanity. Fourth— Your question is: Since God cannot be divided, how can there be three gods and what distinctions are the bases of this division? In reply, I submit that, according to us, the mystery of the Trinity is that on the one hand it is a form of Unity, and on the other hand it is three. We shall explain this presently. The attribute of incomparability comes from the attribute of endlessness because only that thing can be absolutely incompara- ble that erases all possibility of any comparison, and this possibil- ity can only be erased when there remains no space for compari- son. In other words, that thing should also be endless, concerning which it can be said that in its antiquity and essence endlessness