Fazl-e-Umar — Page 325
Fazle Umar 325 by the application of the same principle to both, that is to say, it should be agreed that the question of accession of the two states should be determined either according to the wishes of the respective rulers in each case, or according to the freely expressed wishes of the people of each State. His own inclination was in favour of securing the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan and not in any way obstructing the accession of Hyderabad to India. Unfortunately, his strong pleas on that behalf were ignored by the authorities in Pakistan with dire consequences in the long run. T H E F U RQA n bAT TA L IO n Towards the end of April 1948 it was realised that India had decided to seek a solution of the problem of Kashmir through the use of military force, and military intelligence indicated that India was making preparations for a military advance in strength all along the line in Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Pakistan received a report from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan forces which stressed the perilous situation in which Pakistan would be placed in case of a military advance in force by India along the Kashmir border. The report concluded with a strong recommendation that Pakistan should post its regular forces along the border of Kashmir in sufficient strength to block the advance of the Indian forces. Acting upon the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, the Prime Minister, who also held the portfolio of defence, authorised military dispositions to be made along the Kashmir border in conformity with the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, so that from the first week of May 1948 the regular forces of both Dominions were engaged in combat against each other along the Kashmir border. Hadhrat Khalifatul Masih II [ra] was not content with offering well reasoned advice to the Administration of Pakistan. He made a substantial contribution in terms of men and money towards the struggle that Pakistan was now waging with India over