Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya Part IV — Page 76
BarĀhĪn-e-a H madiyya — Part Four 76 companion—that is, the need for proper experimentation—to truly comprehend the quality of arsenic, in the same way, in order to deem divine matters and the reality of life after death as certainty, reason needs divine revelation; and without this companion, reason cannot operate in matters pertaining to theology, just as reason is helpless, imperfect, and incomplete without other companions in the other sciences. In short, reason cannot consistently conclude anything with cer- tainty on its own unless it is paired with a companion. Without such a companion, it cannot remain safe and immune from mistake and error, especially in relation to knowledge of the Divine, because the essence of all of its discussions and the true nature of this realm are hidden behind veils and nothing similar to it exists in this world. In these matters, imperfect reason cannot escape human error, let alone lead one to perfect divine cognition. The most that can be achieved through reason is only this much: someone hypothesizes the need— be it true or false—for something internally within his own mind; however, he cannot prove that what he deems necessary actually exists externally as well. From this point of view, such a one’s prima facie knowledge—since it is based on a hypothetical need about which one does not know whether or not it corresponds to an external fact—is regarded merely as an unfounded conjecture and is entirely bereft and deprived of the stage of perfect certainty. I have repeatedly stated that it is absolutely impossible that reason should be able to attain the stage of perfect certainty by just piling up hypothetical needs and mere conjectures. Rather, to attain this perfect certainty, all matters whether secular or religious operate in accordance with only one irrevocable law, meaning that, every single matter, whether religious or secular, can attain the stage of perfect certainty only when the knowledge of the true nature of things is not confined merely to the needs perceived by conjectures, and when the basis for the proof of something’s existence is not simply that conjecture demands it, but its actual existence comes to be known