The Riots of 1953 — Page xvi
viii During the years of the independence movement the likes of the Ahrar, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and many other religious parties among India’s Muslims had forcefully opposed the creation of Pa- kistan. The Ahrari leadership referred to the potential new state as Palidistan (land of the impure) and portrayed Jinnah as an infi- del. Syed Abul A'la Maududi and the Jamaat-e-Islami also actively worked against the Muslim League and the creation of Pakistan, deriding Jinnah as someone ‘who does not know even the basics of Islam’ and the Muslim League as a secular rather than reli- gious movement. In Maududi’s estimation the Pakistan which the Muslim League sought to create was one which would be openly antagonistic to the ulema in the same vein as Ataturk’s secular incarnation of Turkey. When Pakistan became a reality, the ulema found themselves discredited. For legitimacy and standing they once again exploited the Ahmadi question, much as they had done during the years of the British Raj. In the aftermath of the violence of 1953, the government of Pakistan constituted a Court of Inquiry to investigate the distur- bances and examine the causes and factors that led to the riots, and to suggest measures to prevent such situations from arising in the future. The Inquiry into the disturbances commenced on 1 July 1953 and concluded in January the next year. The final re- port was published on 10 April 1954. The Munir Report or The Munir-Kiyani Report as it came to be known, did not simply limit itself to investigating the disturbances, but delved into the very heart of the question of what it means to be Muslim and who gets to define an individual's muslimness, as well as ruminating on fun- damental questions about nationhood and Muslim nationalism. While blame for the riots was primarily apportioned to an unruly set of ulema, the report also accused the provincial government