The Reminiscences of Zafrulla Khan — Page 187
171 REMINISCENCES OF SIR MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN proposals laid before the Security Council, Mr. Attlee intervened and upset the whole business. On two occasions, separated from each other by an interval of years, he used the same expression, "And then the disastrous telegram arrived from the Prime Minister. " He himself did not tell me, but at the time when this happened, Ayub, the Secretary I have already mentioned, was able to report to me on very good authority that for a day or two Noel Baker had contemplated resigning rather than readjust himself to the new directions from London. Thus, the failure of the Security Council to secure an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute is attributed largely to the unfortunate intervention of Mr. Attlee from London. That took place probably at the instance of Lord Mountbatten, who must have been moved by Mr. Nehru to intercede with the Prime Minister. The argument used may have been that if the Security Council persisted in laying down the conditions they had set out in the draft resolution for securing a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir that might push India into the arms of the USSR; the kind of argument that had been repeatedly used not only over this problem but over others also, and not only by India. India's attitude had been that whereas they made repeated professions, "we shall withdraw our armies as soon as law and order is restored and the raiders have gone out of Kashmir, and the decision must be made by the people of Kashmir, freely, without any interference. " There was an undercurrent of persistence that the Security Council should not go beyond ordering Pakistan to do whatever it could to get the raiders of the tribal areas out of Kashmir and it should be left to India to ascertain the wishes of the people on the question of accession. The Security Council repeatedly rejected this idea. What the Security Council desired was not only a cessation of fighting and restoration of law and order but also that the plebiscite should take place under conditions which would ensure beyond doubt that it was fair and impartial. That was the crux of the matter. The intervention of Prime Minister Attlee, resulted in the abandonment by the Security Council of its resolution of February 6, 1948, which six of the members had sponsored and which was about to be voted upon when the Indian delegation withdrew from the Security Council to go back to New Delhi for consultations. By the time they came back, all the strings had been pulled and a very much watered- down resolution was proposed and finally adopted on the 21st of April.