Haqiqatul-Wahi (The Philosophy of Divine Revelation) — Page 397
POSTSCRIPT-SIGN NUMBER 137 397 the eternal sovereignty of Parmātmā is nothing more than an artifice to cover up their erroneous creed, because human conscience constantly condemns him for such absurd beliefs. If God is not the Creator of souls and their powers and of particles and their powers, then He cannot possibly be their God either. Also false is the assertion that even though we cannot call souls, in their virgin state, God's servant or creation as they were not created by Him, yet when He infuses souls into bodies, He becomes their God by this much of His action because the Parmeshwar who did not create souls and particles along with all their powers, cannot reasonably be said to be capable of putting them together. Also, joining some of them with others will not entitle Him to become the Parmeshwar. If that were so, He would be like the baker who procures flour from the bazaar, firewood from a timber shop, and fire from a neighbour and then bakes the bread. In such a case, there would be no proof at all of the existence of Parmeshwar because if souls with all their powers are self-exist- ent since eternity, what is the argument to refute that the union and disunion of souls and particles has existed spontaneously since eternity, as contended by atheists? This is why the Aryah Samājists cannot offer any argument for the existence of their Parmeshwar, nor do they have any such argument. This, indeed, is the sum total of the Vedic wisdom which is taken pride in. It is obvious that two kinds of arguments can possibly be advanced in sup- port of the existence of God. One kind of argument is established when His being is acknowledged as the fountainhead of all bounties and only He is accepted as the Creator of every being. As a consequence, it will necessarily follow that, whether the particles of the universe are considered or the souls or the material bodies― all these creations have a Creator. The other method of knowing God is His ever fresh Signs that are mani- fested through the Prophets and Saints. The Āryah Samājists deny them too. Thus, they have no evidence for the existence of their Parmeshwar. It is rather strange that though the Āryas so frequently refer to their Parmeshwar as pitā [father], as Lekh Rām has written just recently in his article about the mubahalah, one wonders what kind of pitä He is. Is He the kind of pitä as when an adopted son addresses a stranger as his pitä, or is He the kind of pitā who is supposedly made through Niyog, when the wife of an Aryah, having destroyed her chastity, has illicit relations with another man, and thus the husband of that woman becomes the father of this child which is obtained through Niyog? For our part, we need not comment if the Parmeshwar of the Āryas is this kind of pitä. However, if He is the kind of pitä who is the Source of souls and particles of the universe with all their capac- ities, and which exist because of Him, then this view is against the principle belief of the Aryah. If you ask why is it against their principle, then let it be