The Gulf Crisis and New World Order — Page 216
Twelfth Frid ay Sem1on Feb 08, 1991 Israel without the active connivance of these powers. Anyhow, this fateful decision was taken and, ever since, this region has been a scene of armed conflicts and a hot bed of international intrigues. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST Two kinds of wars or operations have been undertaken in this region on the pretext of preserving International peace, but were actually calculated to safeguard the vested interests of the West. The first kind of wars were undertaken mostly with the active participation of Britain and France, for serving the Western interests in the region, but the aggressors claimed that they were protecting the interests of the International community. The second kind of wars may be classified as the wars of Jewish expansionism. Britain and France played the most pivotal role in the first kind of wars, and it was done with the U. S. tacit support from behind the scene. The first such operation, conducted to safeguard their selfish interests, was undertaken against Iran. In 1950 the Iranian Parliament proclaimed that since the Iranian oil wealth had become a focal point of international greed and threatened external intervention in Iran, therefore they decided to tum down the offer by the Soviet Union to participate in the exploration of Oil in northern Iran. The Soviet Union argued that just as Iran had permitted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company lo explore and operate the oil fields in southern Iran (which supposedly was done to promote the welfare of Iran, but in fact were deriving lucrative benefits for themselves) the Soviet Union should also be permitted to undertake similar operations to the benefit of both countries. But the Iranian Parliament did not agree to it and remained adamant in their decision that the Soviet Union cannot be granted such permission. Secondly, the Iranian government decided that they would periodically review, their agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and that the next such review would take place in 1951. The U. S. administration acclaimed this decision of the Iranian government because they construed it as a pro-U. S. outcome simply because it seemed lo be a rebuff lo the Soviet Union. In 1951, when the matter of review of the agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company came up before the Iranian Parliament, the British or even the Americans, could not imagine that the terms of the agreement could be altered unilaterally by Iran contrary to the 216