The Criterion for Religions — Page 8
8 Mi'yiirul Madhahib tions and consciousness are self-existing, then com- mon sense sees no need for any external being to bring them together. The reason is that in such a case it would be impossible to explain why things-which have been their own creator since all eternity, and which contain within themselves such properties as are necessary for their mutual connection-stand in need of someone else to bring them together, when they don't even need Parmeshwar for their existence, their faculties or their characteristics. The fact is that joining souls and material bodies to their qualities is also a kind of synthesis. Thus, it proves that just as these eter- nal entities stand in no need of any creator for their existence or for their properties, similarly they do not need any assembler to combine them with one another. It would be the height of folly to admit that such enti- ties do not need any external being for their existence, their properties and their mutual connection, and then to claim, in the same breath, that some entities do need an external being to combine them. This would be a claim without any argument. Thus, in view of this doc- trine, it becomes exceedingly difficult to prove the very existence of Parmeshwar. None can be more un- fortunate than the one who relies on such a Parmeshwar, who, because of His limited power, does not have sufficient means even to prove His own exis- tence. So much for the divine powers of the