Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya Parts I & II — Page 92
92 BAr a h i n-e-a h madiyya arises as to how and through which sure, perfect and easy means can we arrive at such beliefs and discover arguments that will lead us to absolute certainty? In answer, I would like to submit that the certain, perfect and easy means of finding the true principles [of salvation] and their supporting arguments with absolute certainty which involves no toil or labour, nor admits of error, doubt, misgiv- ing or uncertainty, is the Holy Quran. There is no other book and no other means through which we can achieve this great objective. ☆ ☆ The statement that the h oly Quran is the surest, easiest and most perfect means of recognizing the true beliefs will be established with conclusive evidence in due course, and the principles held by the fol- lowers of other Books will also be shown to be false and misconceived. But I would like to address the Brahm u Sam a jists here, who do not believe in any r evealed Book and consider their own reason sufficient for ascertaining the truth. They may ask why reason should not be held as the only sure and straightforward means for arriving at the truth. Although I will deal with this misconception at greater length under the discussion of divine revelation, I find it necessary to dispel this misconception from the very start. It is true that God has endowed man with the faculty of reason, which, like a lamp, shows him the right path and dispels his doubts and misconceptions. It is an extremely useful and essential faculty and a great blessing. Nonetheless, it has one major flaw: it cannot, on its own, take us to the level of absolute certainty with respect to the true nature of things, for absolute certainty consists in knowing things as they actually are. The best that reason can do is to postulate the need for something to exist, but it cannot go further and confirm that it does indeed exist. Perfect certainty, whereby we rise from the level of ‘should be’ to that of ‘is’ is only achieved when reason finds an ally that is capable of confirming its speculative reasoning and bringing it into the realm of perceptible facts; and where reason says, ‘it should be,’ this ally is able to confirm, ‘it is. ’ As I have already pointed out, reason can only establish the need or requirement for something, and not its actual existence, which are two separate things. Anyhow, reason Footnote Number 4